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ROUSSEAU.
BY JOHN SANDISON.
It is said that there is no monument of importance
to the memory of Rousseau in Switzerland, the land
of his birth, or in France, where he made his home.
But nevertheless he has earned for himself a place in
the memory of man which cannot be lost. His writings,
notwithstanding their repeated exaggeration of facts,
form powerful psychological studies, and are written
in such a strangely fascinating style that there is little
danger of their ever being lost to view.
Rousseau formed a curious combination of ration-
alism and an intensely sensitive and imaginative na-
ture, which at times seems to approach insanity, but
we must allow for the fact that there was working
powerfully within him that new and reactionary spirit
which was bound, in the nature of things, to follow
upon the unnatural and highly artificial civilization
which had been developing for a considerable period
in France, and which it was his destiny to overthrow.
Born in Geneva in 1712 he inherited a Calvinistic
spirit and a desire for freedom from all authority of
the Church, for he tells us : " in addition to the general
"feelings which attracted me to the worship of my
"fathers, I had a special aversion for Catholicism
"which belonged to my city. I had been taught to
"regard it as a frightful idolatry. The sentiment
"went so far with me that I never looked into the in-
" side of a church, never met a priest in a surplice,
"never heard the bell of a procession without a shud-
" der of affright, which, though I soon lost it in the
"cities, often returned to me in country parishes
"where I first experienced it."
Rousseau, by his love of natural scenery and soli-
tude and simplicity of life, powerfully influenced his
contemporaries. We can trace his influence in the
outburst of popular fury in the Revolution of 1789,
which, shortly after his death, shook society to its
foundations. We can follow his thoughts in the poems
of Byron and other writers of the early part of this
century. He was the originator of the positive school
of Humanity, with its ideas of equality and fraternity.
He also influenced Herder, the founder of scientific
socialism. Goethe, also, early in life, ia his "Sor-
rows of Werther, " exhibited Rousseau's unsettled and
sensitive spirit, but his powerful mind shortly after-
wards shook off its morbid effects. Rousseau, however,
by his individualism, affected Goethe in another and
more important way. For the greatness of Goethe, from
a philosophical point of view, just lies in the fact
that his monism was never abstract like that of Spi-
noza—it always was vitalised by an active individual-
ism which could not be passed over or neglected in
any contemplation of the "All." From Goethe's point
of view, the higher ideals of life sprang from the due
recognition of the relationship of man to the cosmos
;
and while giving due prominence to that unity he
never forgot that all true work depended on the activ-
ity of man. In " Wilhelm Meister" he says : "Man's
"highest merit always is, as much as possible to rule
"external circumstances, and as little as possible to
" let himself be ruled by them. Life lies before us as
"a huge quarry lies before the architect ; he deserves
"not the name of architect, except when, out of this
"fortuitous mass, he can combine, with the greatest
"economy and fitness and durability, some form, the
"pattern of which originated in his mind."
For a slight sketch of Rousseau's teachings we may
divide his philosophy into three portions, viz. : Edu-
cation, Politics, and Religion.
EDUCATION.
In "Emile" he shapes out the ideal environment
in which the education of a child should be carried
out, and he inveighs against all the artificial customs
of society in his day, which tended to produce minds
utterly at variance with what nature had intended
them to be. He proposed that the young should be
brought up in the simplest and most natural way.
Starting from facts, his problem was to unfold the
mind so that it should be natural in the midst of an
artificial world. He did not wish to subject the child
to book-learning, nor did he care how long it was be-
fore the child learned to read. "Always it must be the
"facts of life that he is to seize hold of." His idea
all through was to cultivate the mind and not to in-
doctrinate.
Rousseau's method was, accordingly, to educate as
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closely to nature as possible, and there have been
many attempts since his day to carry his ideas into
practice.
His call to man to "return to nature " was more
negative than positive, and in endeavoring to set forth
the life of the "noble savage " in all its supposed sim-
plicity, he found that his enthusiasm had carried him
too far ; and then he proceeded to explain that the
state of nature must be supplemented by a stage of
human development beyond it, in which there is the
settled order of the family. In this, he says, is to be
discovered a "golden mean between the indolence of
"the primitive state and the petulant activity of our
"selfishness, and it must be the most happy and
"durable state. " Rousseau shows us here that our
rational nature cannot be developed in abstract isola-
tion, and that it requires a basis of rights and duties,
such as is found in family life, for realising itself.
POLITICS.
In the "Social Contract" Rousseau sets forth his
views on politics.
His individualistic conception of man is again
stated, but not with the purpose of maintaining the
individual in an abstract position, but only as a step
in a process. He says : " The passage from the state of
"nature to the civil state produces in man a very re-
"markable change, in so far as it substitutes justice
"for instinct, as the guide of his conduct, and gives to
"his actions a morality which was hitherto wanting
"in them .... Though by this change he deprives
"himself of many of his natural advantages, those he
" acquires in return are so great, his faculties are exer-
" cised and developed, his ideas are extended, his
"sentiments are ennobled, and his whole soul is ele-
"vated to such a degree, that if the abuses of his new
"condition did not often degrade him below that from
"which he has emerged, he would have cause to bless,
"without ceasing, the happy moment which forever
"rescued him from it, and which, out of a stupid and
" unthinking animal, made him an intelligent being
" and a man."
Here we find that Rousseau, notwithstanding his
apparent failure to recognise the organic idea of soci-
ety in its fulness, saw the importance of the state, and
its educative effects on the individual members ; and
he shows us that the formal freedom of the individual
is attained only when he discovers that his true free-
dom lies not in mere subjective fancies, but in a com-
prehensive public life, where new duties and impulses
will be continually developing.
RELIGION.
The same idea which we have seen in Rousseau's
writings on education and politics, occupies also a
large place in his thoughts about religion, viz.: his
desire to free man from all the restraints of outward
authority of whatever kind, and to allow him absolute
freedom of thought.
All his religious opinions have their ultimate au-
thority in the " sentiment int^rieur, " which, he states,
gives to man all ideas of the existence of God and
moral laws. He says: "I find in it a natural safe-
" guard against the sophisms of my understanding. . . .
" It is that inward voice which reclaims and brings us
" back in spite of ourselves to the way of truth." This
extreme subjectivity of Rousseau, so typical of his
thoughts on all subjects, adhered to him all through
life.
* *
Rousseau gives no indication of a desire to attain
to a philosophical conception of a world-order, but
still his efforts all tended towards a greater harmony
between nature and man in an ideal sense, and pre-
pared the way for the higher unitary conceptions of
existence, which occupy so much of the philosophical
thought of the present day.
The mainspring of all Rousseau's teaching is
found in his idea of liberty—a liberty regarded as
largely independent of the rights of others. A freedom
of this kind is, however, abstract, and not long after
his death his "liberty" became the watchword of the
revolutionists of 1789 ; "his spirit walked abroad" in
the bloody orgies and rioting of the Revolution, how-
ever much he, as an individual, would have recoiled
from such scenes ; and thus his abstract principle re-
quired to be purified and to be worked back into a
more concrete and lasting form.
PROFESSOR HAECKEL'S CONFESSION OF FAITH.
Prof. Ernst Haeckel has recently published a pam-
phlet, bearing the title, "Monism as the Bond Be-
tween Religion and Science. The Confession of Faith
of a Naturalist." (Bonn: Emil Strauss, 1892.)
This pamphlet of forty-seven pages is vigorously
written and shows its famous author in one of his
happiest hours. The substance of it is an extemporane-
ous speech delivered on October 9, 1892, in Altenburg,
at the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Naturalists' Club
of Osterland. Professor Schlesinger, of Vienna, had
been the orator of the day; his subject being " Natur-
wissenschaftliche Glaubens-Satze. " The spirit of his
oration aroused some objection among the audience,
and Professor Haeckel was requested by several of his
colleagues to make a reply. A full report of this re-
ply was published in the Altenburger Zeitung, and was
reprinted, with some additional remarks, in the Frcie
Biihnc (III, Heft ii,) and appears now, in a more com-
plete form, as an independent pamphlet. The author
has carefully revised his speech, has here and there
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emphasised his propositions, and has added valuable
notes, containing further explanations and references.
The tone of the pamphlet bears witness to its
origin ; it is buoyant and sprightly. The main idea of
Professor Haeckel's view is set forth in the title. Pro-
fessor Haeckel maintains that the doctrine of monism
is the bond of union between religion and science, mak-
ing a reconciliation of them possible. The pamphlet
contains his confession of faith, and his faith is ex-
actly the same as that of The Open Court; it is faith
in the religion of science.
Professor Haeckel recognises as the highest duty
of our time <^das Iii'iliste Ziel unsercr Gfis/cs//ui/ii;kei/)
the amalgamation of religion and science in the sense
proposed by The Open Court, the efforts of which
journal he especially mentions in his preface. In a
private letter he adds that the differences that ob-
tain between his views and those editorially pre-
sented in TJie Open Court appear to him of secondary
importance onl}', and should not hinder us from fight-
ing shoulder to shoulder. We gladly agree with him,
and hail him as a companion-in-arms.
The main tenet of the religion of science is the
recognition of the fact that there is but one truth, and
that science possesses the right method of searching
for the truth. There is but one religion : the religion
of truth. Religious truth must be investigated and
stated not less systematically than any other truth ; it
must be inquired into with the best, maturest, and
most scientific methods at our command.
There are some points of disagreement between
Professor Haeckel's position and ours, and we do not
intend to minimise them. They are, perhaps, of more
importance than they seem. Nevertheless, in the face
of our agreement in principle, they may be overcome,
and I trust that we shall still come to a complete
agreement. Our differences have been set forth in
The Monist ( January, 1893). There is no need of re-
peating them here.
The agreement between Professor Haeckel's posi-
tion and ours also appears in his opposition to the at-
tempts to preach pure ethics—ethics that leaves the
religious and philosophical questions out of sight. He
says in one of his notes (on p. 45):
'
'All ethics, theoretical as well as practical, stands as a branch
of the normative sciences in an immediate connection with our
world-conception, and, therefore, also with religion. I regard this
maxim as very important and have defended it in an article en-
titled 'Ethics and World-Conception,' written with special ref-
erence to the lately established German society for ethical culture.
The society for ethical culture attempts to teach and further eth-
ics without any reference to a world-conception or religion. ( See
the new weekly, Die Zulninfl, Berlin 92, No. 5-7, edited by Maxi-
milian Harden.)*
* Die Zukun/t is the same jourDal of which a late number, containiDg an
article on the education of princes, was confiscated by the imperial authori-
ties.
—
Ed.
The time is ripe for a great religious reform. Even
the trials for heresy, as they are prosecuted to-day,
bear evidence of the fact that light is beginning to
penetrate into the very darkest nooks of our churches.
The bats and owls flutter about in dismay, and the
whole process, so terrible in former times, has become
pleasantly ridiculous.
The generation of to-day is on the very brink of
recognising the truth that the God of Moses and the
God of Christ is after all different from the God of the
presbytery and of the various confessions of faith ; he
is the same God as the God of Science.
What is the authority of these formulas of faith ?
They are not based upon evidence, not upon proofs
that can be revised ; the}' were declared to be infalli-
ble truths by a majority vote of some bigoted, narrow-
minded old fogies, who had not the slightest inkling
about the nature of truth and science and still less any
authority to pronounce their utterances as the voice of
God. How childish it is to reject the revelations of God
in nature, wherever it happens to be in conflict with the
blundering opinions of a few elders I But their time
has come. Man-made religions will pass away, and
the religion of truth will prevail.
There is but one God, and this one God is the God
of the religion of Science. p. c.
IDEAS, THEIR ORIGIN AND DESTINY.
1. COMPOSITES OF BLENDED MEMORIES.
Mr. Francis G.^lton, in order to procure truly
representative faces, contrived the method of compo-
site portraiture ; to wit, he photographed a certain
class of persons upon the same photographer's sensi-
tive plate, adjusting the different faces to the same
size, and laying one upon the other so that all their
eyes fell upon the same horizontal, and their noses
upon the same vertical line. The results which he ob-
tained are, as is well known, remarkable. They "bring
into evidence all the traits in which there is agreement,
and leave but a ghost of a trace of individual peculiar-
ities. There are so many traits in common of all faces
that the composite picture when made from many
compounds is far from being a blur ; it has altogether
the look of an ideal composition."
Now, suppose that the photographer's sensitive
plate were actually endowed with sentiency. We should
in that case have an instance similar to that which ac-
tually exists in the brains of living beings. Similar
impressions are made through the different sense-or-
gans and registered in their respective sensory centres.
Registrations of the same kind are not made sidef by
side ; they are not independent single pictures asso-
ciated among themselves ; they are placed one upon
the other, all forming a peculiar new formation, viz.,
a composite memory-structure or an ideal image of all
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the objects of the same kind that have come under
observation.
The generic images of the mind are, according to
Mr. Galton, the product of blended memories, and he
suggests that the term "cumulative idea" would be
more appropriate than "abstract idea."
The composites of blended memories, built up by
successive sense-impressions, acquire meaning and
come to represent the various objects of the surround-
ing world. As such, i. e., as meaning-endowed com-
posite images of living feelings, they form the elements
of the soul.
II. THE NATURE OF PERCEPTIONS.
Perhaps everybody has sometimes in his experience
been puzzled by the sight of an object the character
of which he was unable to recognise. We see a cer-
tain something and do not know what it is. The out-
lines are perhaps clear, the colors are distinct. Never-
theless, we cannot make out what kind of a thing it is.
What can this psychical phenomenon teach us ?
It proves that a sense-impression is quite a differ-
ent thing from a perception. A sense-impression that
is felt is called a "sensation" ; and a sensation may be
perfect and yet a perception need not be brought about.
A perception is only effected if the sense-impression
is transmitted to the memory-structures of its class so
that it can be interpreted as a certain object, so that
it can be identified with former impressions of the same
kind, so that it can be recognised as such and such a
thing.
That which has been called the cerebral centre of
vision, is nothing but the place in which the composite
memories of sight-impressions are contained. A crea-
ture whose centre of vision has been destroyed has
lost the repository of th'ose impressions which it has re-
ceived through the eye. It is soul-blind, or seelen-hlind,
as it has been called by German savants. Again, that
which has been called the centre of hearing is nothing
but the place in which composite memories of auditory
impressions are contained ; and a creature whose cen-
tre of hearing has been destroyed can no longer recog-
nise sounds. It is soul-deaf, or seelen-tatib. And the
same is true of all the so-called different centres of
soul-life.
Professor Goltz has succeeded in keeping alive a
dog whose entire hemispheres have been removed.
While all other organs, especially his senses, are in
perfect order, he has lost all his memory-structures,
and with them the composite images shaped by former
experiences. Thus he is a perfect idiot, a soulless crea-
ture, capable of receiving sense-impressions through
all his sense-organs, but all the various sense-impres-
sions remain meaningless to him.
A perception is the simplest act of cognition, for a
perception is a sensation that has reached and revived
its analogous memory-structure. There it is, so to say,
subsumed. Having the same or a similar form the
sense-impression fits into the form of the memory-
structures and is felt to be of the same kind. This
classification of things belonging to the same kind is
the essential nature of cognition : perceptions are prim-
itive judgments.
III. GENERALISATION PRIOR TO COGNITION.
There has been much controversy concerning the
priority of general or of particular ideas. On the one
hand, general ideas were said to have sprung from
particular ideas : the primum appcUatum and primum
cognitiim, it was maintained, were concrete objects.
And on the other hand, it was objected that the very
first act of naming, and indeed every act of cognition,
presupposes the existence of a general idea. The latter
view is quite correct
;
yet, when this view is adduced to
prove the mysteriousness of cognition, hinting that
there is a break in nature between that which is mind
and that which is without mind, we must seriously pro-
test.
When we keep before our minds the physiological
process of perception, the reason is obvious why every
idea must be at bottom a general idea, and why every
act of cognition presupposes some general notion under
which a particular notion is subsumed. Every sense-
impression is a particular, while the analogous mem-
ory-structure, which is ready to receive any sense-im-
pression of the same kind, is, or at least, stands for
a general, notion. And this notion is the more vague,
the more primitive it is.
Generalisation, accordingly, is not one of the high-
est faculties of the mind, but its very lowest. Mind be-
gins with generalisation.
The first particular sensation is a particular act
;
yet
it is no notion. Only the first composite of memories
partakes of the nature of generalisations, of generic
images, of cumulative ideas ; and therefore the first
perception, i. e. , the first and most rudimentary act
of cognition is a subsumption ; it presupposes already
the existence of a general notion.
IV. APPERCEPTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS.
A perception is, in turn, the most elementary act
of apperception ; and apperception is the function of
consciousness.
When analysing the nature of consciousness,we find
that it consists of coordinating, centralising, and intensi-
fying feelings in a focus. A single and isolated feeling
cannot exist as an actual feeling. It becomes an ac-
tual feeling only when it meets another feeling by
which it is felt. Thus feelings are possible only in
those organisms in which feelings are so organised or
THE OPEN COURT. 3531
systeniatised that sensations are referred to the mem-
ories of former sense-impressions. The organ of sys-
tematising feehngs is called the nervous system.
Suppose a sense-impression were made upon a sen-
tient organism void of memories— i. e., an organism
which has never as yet received prior sense- impres-
sions. The isolated feeling produced by a first sense-
impression (if feeling it can be called) is very different
from later feelings, for its scale of consciousness is not
merely extremely low, but actually zero, there is no
other feeling to apperceive it. The second sense-im-
pression of the same kind, however, meets with and
revives the trace left by the first one. It is received
in the memory-structure of the first sense-impression
and there it is felt. This act of the memor^'-structure
is the weakest kind of apperception imaginable.
Isolated feelings may be called feelings, but they
are not felt. Several or at least two feelings must meet
for being felt.
The stronger and the more manifold the memory-
structures grow, the more cognisant does apperception
become. A sense-impression will in higher stages re-
vive several memory-structures, and their feelings will
be concentrated upon it. The object of attention is
now focused and the act of its being felt is intensified
by a coordination of feelings. Thus dim feelings de-
velop by coordination into clear consciousness, and the
organised memory-structures form a more and more
definite basis of psychic life constituting a certain char-
acter, which when it reaches the domain of human life,
is called personality.
V. .APPERCEPTION AND WILL.
The question has been raised whether or not ap-
perception is an act of the will, and the answer de-
pends upon the meaning we attach to the word "will."
The most elementary kind of a will is to be found
in the spontaneity of the simplest processes in nature.
The actions and reactions of chemicals, the ether vi-
brations of light and electricity, and also the gravita-
tion of a stone are motions that take place because
the moving object possesses a certain quality which
under special conditions makes it act in a certain way.
These motions are self-motions or spontaneous motions.
Schopenhauer uses the word "will" in this sense.
By "will," however, we generally understand a
peculiar kind of that inherent quality of things which
makes them move : will is the spontaneit}' only of in-
telligent beings. A tendency to pass into motion is
called will only when it is accompanied by conscious-
ness. Will is the incipient motion the motive cause
of which is a representative image (generally called
motor idea) in the agent's mind ; the object repre-
sented in this representative image being the aim or
end to be attained.
Primitive apperception is a spontaneous action, for
the act of apperception takes place because of the pe-
culiar qualities of the acting organism. It is an activ-
ity of the feeling substance : it is an apprehending
and not merely a passive state of receiving impres-
sions.
The peculiar qualities of an organism, which make
apperception possible, are (i) ps^xhical, for the mem-
ory-structures are endowed with sentiency, and (2)
mental, for they possess representative value, they are
endowed with meaning. Thus apperception is (in its
primitive appearance, and of course in a very rudiment-
ary way) at once a psychical and a mental process. But
it does not become an act of will until the memory-
structures grow strong and independent enough to ex.
ercise a choice and give preference to a certain kind of
sense-impressions. By a neglect of any other sense-
impressions all available sentiency is focused upon one
object or upon the search for one kind of object. This
phenomenon, best observable in the hunt for food, is
called attention, and attention is " apperception guided
by will."
Whether or not amcebas and protozoa exhibit an
elementary will when hunting for food is simpl)' a
question of terminology. According to Schopenhauer
they possess will ; according to the customary usage
of the term, not. Their tissues demand a restoration
of their waste products and they seek to satisfy this
want. Their tendencies are much more complex
processes than the affinities of chemical substances,
but there is no radical difference between the two
actions. Dr. Max Verworn has proved that the protru-
sion of pseudopods in the amoeba is caused by their
chemotropy for oxygen, while their contraction, (i. e.
the return of the plasma to the nuclear substance),
after an irritation of some kind which changes their
chemical constitution, is due to a chemotropy for the
nuclear substances. Their motions are tendencies ;
they are not actions of a will. We can speak of a will
as soon as the irritation which causes a contraction of
living substance is a commotion possessing a repre-
sentative value. There must be memory-structures
which not only feel the want for a restoration of the
waste products in the tissues of the organism but have
also a recollection of its prior satisfaction. This recol-
lection is the primitive form of a motor-idea. It serves
as an irritation upon the motor organs of the organism
to hunt for food. Thus the cause of the action is a
mental state, and the action is planned, however
vaguely it may be. The aim of the action is the reali-
sation of the motor-idea. There is no action of the
will without either a motive, which is the motor-idea,
or without an end in view or purpose, which is the ob-
ject represented by the motor-idea.
That there is no definite line of demarcation where
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tendencies become purposive acts of a will is a matter
of course, which, as in all analogous cases of evolu-
tionary products, detracts nothing from the distinction
to be made between these lower and higher pheno-
mena of organised life.
VI. IDEAS AND THE LIFE OF IDEAS.
Perceptions are the simplest acts of soul-life. But
in the course of evolution a higher activity of soul-
life grows from them as soon as sounds are em-
ployed to designate certain composite pictures. These
sound-symbols create a new sphere of mental life with
higher possibilities. Meaning-endowed sound-symbols
are called "words," and the mechanism of words or ar-
ticulate speech creates the domain of rational thought,
which in its highest perfection is called science.
The meanings of words and of combinations of words
are called ideas.
And what wonderful things are ideas, these highest
kinds of meaning- freighted feelings ! Every idea pos-
sesses an individuality of its own. Ideas grow and de-
velop, they migrate from one brain into another, being
transferred through the word-symbols of spoken or
written language. Ideas'adapt themselves to new en-
vironments; they struggle among themselves; some of
them are victorious, others succumb. Some are exter-
minated, others survive." Those that survive suffer
changes from assimilation among themselves. Some
are powerful, others are weak, and a few assume do-
minion over their companions.
Ideas are real living beings : each one of them pos-
sesses a special individualitj' and all of them are, as it
were, citizens of that wonderful commonwealth which
is called " the soul."
It has been said that states, churches, and other
superindividual beings do not exist. We do not intend
to discuss the problem now ; but it appears that ideas
would have at least the same right to deny the exist-
ence of human personalities, for a human personality
is only a society of ideas.
We may compare ideas (without going astray or
being fantastical) to real persons. At least the idea
we have of persons is after all the most appropriate
simile we have to characterise their being. Think only
of moral ideas, of ideals, of religious sentiments ! They
enter the souls of men and take hold of their entire ex-
istence often in spite of their will. And what a pro-
found truth lies in the dogma of resurrection ! Jesus
the crucified has actually risen from the dead. His-
torical investigations have been made as to whether
the apparitions of Christ as seen by his disciples, ac-
cording to the gospels, were not hallucinations; and
the possibility of his bodily resurrection has been de-
nied. It is true, and let it be true, that corpses can-
not be revived. But what of that ? We need not mind
the fate of the body in the face of the truth that the
soul possesses immortal life. Christ is actually a liv-
ing presence in humanity, and his spirit was and is
still the most dominating power in the evolution of
mankind. The dogmatist, so-called, and exactly so his
adversary, the infidel, so-called, imagine that Chris-
tianity must be a fraud unless it can be proved that
the corpse of Jesus became reanimated. The concep-
tion of both the orthodox as well as the infidel are ma-
terialistic ; both overlook the reality and importance
of soul-life.
Ye of little faith and of still less understanding ! It
is a pagan notion to build a religion on the resurrec-
tion of corpses. True religion is based upon the im-
mortality of the soul ; and the immortality of the soul
is no mere phrase, no empty allegory, no error or fraud :
it is fact provable by science ; it is a reality without
which no higher soul-life, no progress, no evolution
would be possible : it is the corner-stone of religion
and the basis of ethics. p. c.
CURRENT TOPICS.
A PASSIONATE appeal to Congress is made by a Philadelphia
paper against a right which I thought was quite secure from legis-
lative interference, the blessed privilege of wearing rags. In a fit
of newspaper hysterics the organ exclaims ; " Keep out the rags
—
this is the first duty of the government. Cholera is certain to re-
appear in Europe. It is sure to spread along lines of travel. It
will come to this country unless it is kept out. It will travel as it
always has done by way of the rags. Keep out the rags." This
presents to me a dread alternative ; and on whichever horn I sit I
find it very uncomfortable, but if there is a shade of difference in
the danger it is in favor of the cholera. I think it will be safer for
me to risk that, than to do without rags. Wool is already kept Out ;
and if rags are to be kept out also, what's to become of me ? By
the laws of my country I am already forbidden to wear wool, and
as a law-abiding citizen, I have adopted shoddy. They now pro-
pose to deprive me of that by shutting out rags. This will put me
in the situation of Tim Burke of Marbletown, who was asked one
day by a shopkeeper to buy a trunk, "What for?" says Tim.
" To keep your clothes in," said the trader. "And then," says
Tim, " if I keep my clothes in a trunk, what will I wear ?" I re-
peat the question of Tim Burke, and say. If rags are to be kept out
of the country, what will I wear ? Cotton makes a very good sub-
stitute in the summer time, but it is twelve degrees below zero in
Chicago to-day, and when the temperature is that low, a blizzard
from the North goes through cotton like a knife. I will propose
this compromise to Congress ; I will agree that you ^hall keep out
rags, if you will agree to let in wool.
*
* *
They have lately formed in Philadelphia an "Educational
Club," composed of men engaged in the work of teaching or of
superintendence in the schools of that city. The object of the club
is to advance the standard of the profession of teaching, through
the discussion of educational topics, and by means of the work of
various committees. The enterprise is praiseworthy, and it might
well be imitated in Chicago, because any plan to elevate the stand-
ard of teachers and teaching deserves encouragement. No doubt
many teachers have much to learn about the science of teaching,
and a comparison of methods by means of Educational Clubs must
prove useful, not only to the teachers, but also to the pupils in the
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schools. At the very beginning, it would be well to examine the
methods by which teachers are appointed and removed ; because
the office of teacher ought to be secure, and reasonably independ-
ent ; free from outside influences, and especially from the hopes
and fears of political rewards and punishments. When teachers
are appointed and discharged at the demand of an ignorant saloon
keeper who happens to be an alderman, the standard of the pro-
fession is lowered so as to meet the lesser stature of an ordinary
city council, or something like that. Will the Educational Club
give its early attentain to the vast quantity of precious brain energy
wasted by little children in the study of spelling ; in the paragraph
system by which they are made bad readers for life ; in the copy-
book system by which they are taught at the cost of immense time
and labor to write a cramped and crippled hand ; and in the geo-
graphy torment which compels them to commit to memory the
names of all the towns, counties, kingdoms, islands, continents,
mountains, valleys, lakes, rivers, oceans, gulfs, and seas ? If the
Educational Clubs will become societies for the prevention of
cruelty to children, and will stop that awful waste they will de-
serve everlasting fame.
In a letter which I have just received from Mr. George Julian
Harney, now in England, he says, " Albert, the last of the Provi-
sional Government of 1848 is dead. A noble man, if ever there
was one." That is all ; and yet the kindly tribute at the end may
last a long time, perhaps longer than a marble monument, for a
printed word is nearer to immortality than any other mortal thing.
To die, and be called " a noble man" is a triumph over death.
Who knows anything about -\Ibert now ? Or cares ? Noiseless
as a bubble on the water, he dissolves into the eternal sea ; and yet
this man had once the powers of a king in France. He was one
of the animating and directing forces of a brave and mighty people
in a revolutionary time ;- a picturesque figure, he stood forth, in
bold relief, among "The Men of Forty-Eight." He helped in
overturning the throne of Louis Phillippe. and in laying upon its
ruins the foundations of a promising republic, only to find, what
Caesar found, how fickle are the Gauls. I have before me now
the roster of the Provisional Government ;—eleven Governors
France had then—and amongst them some historic men, like Arago,
Louis Blanc, and Lamartine. At the very bottom of the list is
Albert (ouvrier), or Albert (working-man). It is a weird coinci-
dence that Albert (ouvrier), is the last on the list of the Provisional
Governors, and he was the last of them to die. I have before me
also some proclamations of the eleven Governors, in which they
command the Sun to stand still on Gibeon, and the Moon in the
valley of Ajalon ; or in other words, the proclamations in which
they decree all sorts of possible and impossible things ; the price
of bread, for example ; redemption by the government, and the
restoration to their owners of all the goods pawned by the poor
;
work and wages for everybody ; and wages without work for those
who had moral scruples against labor. They thought they could
establish an inexhaustible fountain of prosperity in the Faubourg
St. Antoine, and connect it by invisible pipes with an imaginary
reservoir somewhere in the Delectable mountains ; a reservoir
which "the rich " would everlastingly keep full. Albert, (ouvrier),
was truly "a noble man," but he was a dreamer of dreams; as
was, indeed, his colleague, Lamartine, and his other colleague, the
famous man of science, Arago, well enough in physical astronomy,
but a political astronomer who saw stars in the heavens that were
not there; as also did Lamartine, and Albert, (ouvrier). They
thought that a people could become dependent on Government for
a living, and be at the same time free.
* *
From one proclamation of the Provisional Government I
quote the following sensible decree : " Royalty, under whatever
forms it assumes, is abolished. No more Legitimacy—no more
Bonapartism — no Regency." This decree was hailed by the
French people with delirious joy, and yet in a few days they re-
lapsed into Imperialistic idolatry and chose for their national
chief a most inferior type of Bonaparte. When Albert (ouvrier)
saw, or thought he saw, the revolution going backward, a trick
that revolutions have in spite of the proverb otherwise ; when he
saw the republic sliding down, he tried to arrest its reaction by a
counterplot in the form of a supplementary amendment to the
February revolution, and for two or three hours on the fifteenth
of May it looked as if he might succeed ; but the middle classes
—
without whose aid no revolution can succeed in any country—the
middle classes, thinking that they saw in Albert (ouvrier) a resur-
rection of " the terror, " fought for the National Assembly, sup-
pressed the new rebellion, arrested Albert (ouvrier) and carried
him to prison, where they kept him for ten years. When he came
out he saw the Bonapartism that he had abolished, cheered by the
ignoble acclamations of the French people, riding rampant over
France. Weary at heart, he withdrew, with becoming dignity, to
some vety humble work that gave him an honest living. From
his retirement he watched the mad procession through all its
crooked policies and through its treacherous paths of simulated
glory to the catastrophe of Sedan. He never stooped for place or
power, nor did he ever coin his great political opportunities into
money. .\nd so, farewell ; a long farewell, to Albert (ouvrier)!
*
* *
On the tenth of January the Governor of Illinois took the oath
of office at the capitol, and the inauguration ceremonies will ex-
cite the wonder of the world. They show us a patriotic occasion
diminished by the intolerance of party. A pageant of mutual for-
bearance and good-will was twisted into a festival of swagger,
wherein the triumphant side exulted over the other. An official
ceremony of high dignity, in which Judges, Representatives, Sen-
ators, and others of opposing politics took part, shrunk to the
moral size of a party celebration. When the election of a Gov-
ernor is ratified and confirmed by both houses of the legislature,
by Democrats and Republicans alike, in the form of a solemn in-
auguration, the very ceremonial itself proclaims that the common-
weal is greater than any faction ; but the managers of this inaugu-
ration evidently think that there is, outside and above the com-
monweal, a corporate existence known as the Democratic party ;
and that the claims of that corporation must be considered before
the public welfare. It is hardly a matter of civic pride to any of
us that in the very middle of the proceedings the Cook County
Marching Club, a strictly partisan organization, raising tumultuous
yells and "bearing aloft their gorgeous banner," filed into the hall.
We can hardly believe it, but the papers tell it, that a big rooster
was provided, whose duty it was to crow at a certain stage of the
solemnity, which he valorously did. In manner, voice, and style
he was the most representative person there, and he spoke for his
constituents—the majority. The two most conspicuous actors in
the play did much to relieve it of its coarseness. These were the
two governors, Altgeld and Fifer. Neither of them said anything
or did anything that was not refined and dignified. Considering
the magnanimity of Governor Fifer in gracing the triumph of his
rival, nothing could have been in more deplorable taste than a
glee club greeting him with doggerel songs, explaining how "Joe
Fifer's goose was cooked;" and reducing to poetry the additional
information that "Altgeld is the man who put him in the soup."
* *
During the late ' ' campaign, " a Republican lawyer of Chicago,
conversing with some friends, remarked that he should vote for
Altgeld ; whereupon one of the party rebuked him and asked him
if he had e%'er read Altgeld's dangerous book and if he knew its
character. "No," said the other, " I know nothing about it, but
I think it will be such a rare luxury for the people of Illinois to
have a governor who knows enough to write a book about any-
3534 THE OPEN COURT.
thing." The inaugural message of Governor Altgeld seems to jus-
tify that reason for supporting him. This message is so eminently
direct and practical ; so earnestly occupied with "live questions,"
instead of dead one^ , that we painfully miss our venerable friends,
the commonplace generalities of old. The Governor is aware
" that few people pay attention to inaugural addresses," for which
neglect there has hitherto been good reason ; but this message will
be read, for it will compel the attention of men. It strikes at
wrongs that have become despotic, and its accusations must be
answered; for instance, this: "Practically, there is neither
Magna Charta nor the Bill of Rights for the poor of our great
cities." Nothing so bold as that has been said in messages of late,
and it is uncomfortably non-partisan. It impeaches Democrats
and Republicans alike, for if the specifications that accompany the
charge are true, it is very clear that our executive magistrates and
our judicial magistrates of high and low degree, of both parties,
are all guilty together and equally responsible for the wrong.
Both Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights are embodied in the
Constitution of the United States and in the Constitution of Illi-
nois, and if those constitutions have been suspended in Chicago,
for the oppression of the poor, by the officers and courts appointed
and sworn to maintain them, what security have the rich that it
may not be convenient some day to foreclose tJidir interest in
Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights ? The judges, at least, ought
to be examples of "a law-abiding people."
M. M. Trumbull.
BOOK REVIEWS.
Stories from the Greek Comedians. 'By Jifv. Alfred J. Chiirth,
M. A. With sixteen illustrations after the antique. New
York and London : MacMillan & Co. 1892. Pp. 344.
Price, $1,00.
The Rev. Prof. Alfred Church is known as the author of a
large number of works designed for the popularisation of ancient
literature. The present volume from his hand is made up of
representative plays from the three recognised periods of Greek
comedy—the old, the middle, and the new. The plays of the first
and second period are from Aristophanes ("The Acharnians,
"
"The Knights," "Peace," "The Wasps," "The Clouds," "The
Birds," "The Frogs,' "The Parliament of Women," and
"Plutus"). The plays of the third period are from Philemon,
Diphilus, Menander, and Apollodorus, being translations of
Terence and Plautus ("The Buried Treasure," "The Ghost,"
"The Shipwreck," "The Brothers," "The Girl of Andros," and
"Phormio"). The book is adorned with sixteen beautifully exe-
cuted illustrations after the antique, is prettily and appropriately
bound and printed on excellent paper. Its cheapness is remark-
able.
Professor Church has, in parts, well accomplished his task.
Some of the refrains in "The Clouds," "The Birds," "The
Frogs," are exceedingly well done and may be read with enjoy-
ment and with the perfect unconsciousness that they were origin-
ally Greek. In other parts he has not been quite so successful.
Some points are strained and too much emphasised. What should
be left ancient is sometimes modernised, and that which should be
modernised is sometimes left ancient. But this work of repro-
duction is very difficult. It can never be the work of one man.
Its fulfilment will require perhaps centuries and call into requisi-
tion the labors of scores of collaborators. Each shall contribute
his mite, each will elaborate some little point ; till ultimately a
master mind, guided by the efforts of all, fully appreciating the
spirit of the production of which he is at work, and possessed of
the power of expression of that modern Greek who wrote " Iphi-
genia auf Tauris," will give to the world a production which will
make us forget that Greece and Rome existed thousands of years
ago and are not now living among us. impii.
The Dynamic Theory of Life and Mind. By James B. Ale.x-
ttiulcr. Minneapolis, Minn. ; The Housekeeper Press. 1893.
The sub-title of this work tells us that it is "an attempt to
show that all organic beings are both constructed and operated by
the dynamic agencies of their respective environments." It is a
large heavy book of 1067 closely printed pages. It may be desig-
nated as a compendium of the general facts of the following sci-
ences : Anatomy (comparative and human). Physiology, Embry-
ology, Physics, Geology, Chemistry, Psychology, and Anthropol-
ogy, Mineralogy, and the Science of Evolution. The author, in
this compilation, has made good use of the best authorities, and
has, so far as we can judge, faithfully reproduced what is found
in them. The book contains 400 illustrations. Its production must
have been a matter of some expense. .\nd in view of this fact we
think it might have been supplied with a better binding. In the
main, little objection may be found to the author's method of pro-
cedure. We think, however, that it would have been much better
had he confined his expositions to the simple statement of his own
peculiar views and left the work of detail for the text-books of the
special sciences. The tendency of his doctrine is somewhat to-
wards mechanicalism. He is inclined to see in the physical ante-
cedents of mental phenomena the direct causes of these phenom-
ena. He believes that " mental action is a form of physical energy,"
that the ether is "the soul of the universe," "the soul of things,"
and so forth. We think that if the author had combined some
philosophical studies with his scientific reading he would hardly
have ventured to put forth such hypotheses. Another view which
in our judgment mars the work, is the author's belief in telepathy.
The medium of the transference of thought, he thinks, is the ether.
It is true, the thoughts of the mind are accompanied by motions
or vibrations of feeling brain-substance : but it is not the objective
fact of motion that constitutes the thought ; there is no " meaning "
in the simple mechanical fact of motion. How then can any purely
mechanical medium like the ether be the vehicle of thought ? The
ether is an instrument of physical research, not of psychical. Its
role is motion, not thought. On these grounds we think that the
position of the author is, philosophically, an uncritical one, though
some of his points of view—for example, his criticism of Bain's
theory of pleasure and pain—are well taken. ///./w.
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